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1 Introduction
Announcements by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which occur regularly at pre-
speciﬁed dates, are one of themost highly anticipated events by investors around theworld. Through
these announcements, the Federal Reserve communicatesmonetary policy in the form of setting the
target federal funds rate.
Given the close link between currency markets and monetary policy, it is only natural to expect
that FOMC announcements can have large impacts on exchange rates. Indeed, this was illustrated
recently by the announcement onMarch 18, 2015, when the Australian dollar appreciated more than
2% against the U.S. dollar within a few hours in the run-up to the announcement (corresponding to
a three standard deviation daily change), followed by a 1.6% depreciation right after the announce-
ment. The active nature of the currencymarkets (with a daily turnover of overUSD5 trillion), coupled
with high market concentration and the participants’ ability to operate with very high leverage ratios
means that even small price movements in this market can translate into economically signiﬁcant
effects.1,2
In this paper, we document that announcements by the FOMC have an economically and sta-
tistically signiﬁcant impact on the excess returns of a host of different currencies vis-a`-vis the U.S.
dollar. More speciﬁcally, by relying on high-frequency data, we document that a trading strategy that
is short the U.S. dollar and long other currencies exhibits signiﬁcantly larger excess returns on days
with scheduled FOMC announcements relative to non-announcement days. Crucially, the excess
returns earned by following such a strategy span the entire announcement day, consisting of a pre-
as well as a post-announcement component. We also document that these excess returns (i) are
higher for currencies with higher interest rate differentials vis-a`-vis the U.S.; (ii) increase withmarket
participants’ uncertainty about monetary policy; and (iii) intensify when the Fed adopts a policy of
monetary easing.
We interpret these ﬁndings through the lens of a parsimonious model of exchange rate determi-
nation in the spirit of Gabaix and Maggiori (2015), in which constrained ﬁnanciers with short in-
vestment horizons intermediate global demand for currencies. These ﬁnanciers can actively engage
in currency trades, but have a downward-sloping demand for risk taking, which limits their risk-
bearing capacity. Such a limit can arise for a variety of reasons, such as limited commitment frictions
or value-at-risk constraints.3 Crucially, in addition to the “fundamental risk” in global demand and
supply for currencies, ﬁnanciers in our model also face “monetary policy uncertainty” due to poten-
tial future changes in interest rates.
Based on this framework, we show that an increase in uncertainty regarding future interest rates
1Citibank and Deutsche Bank hold over 30% of the market share.
2According to the Bank for International Settlements (2015), USD 364 billion are traded daily in the AUD-USD market.
Therefore, as a back-of-the-envelope calculation, a 2% appreciation of the Australian dollar against the U.S. dollar (as
observed before the March 2015 FOMC announcement) results in a USD 7.28 billion move, which given the high leverage
ratios — a 1% margin is typical — implies a USD 728 billion movement in investors’ balance sheets within hours.
3Our baseline model presented in Section 2 assumes that ﬁnanciers are subject to a limited commitment constraint as
in Gabaix and Maggiori (2015). In the Appendix, we provide an alternative model with value-at-risk constraints and show
that all our results remain virtually the same.
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in the U.S. results in higher excess returns for other currencies: the ﬁnanciers are willing to engage in
currency trade and bear this extra risk only if they are compensated accordingly with higher returns.
As such, all else equal, an increase in monetary policy uncertainty due to an upcoming FOMC an-
nouncement results in the depreciation of foreign currencies against the U.S. dollar, coupled with an
expected appreciation in the future. We also establish that the increase in excess returns in response
to monetary policy uncertainty is higher for currencies with larger interest rate differentials vis-a`-vis
the U.S. This is due to the fact that even though a larger interest rate differential induces an exchange
rate adjustment, ﬁnanciers’ risk-bearing constraints all but ensure that this adjustment does not
offset the increase in the exchange rate differential one for one, thus resulting in higher overall excess
returns.
The fact that higher currency excess returns are meant to compensate ﬁnanciers for the uncer-
tainty in monetary policy means that such returns are materialized irrespective of the interest rates
set by the Fed following the announcement. As such, we interpret the impact of monetary policy un-
certainty on currency excess returns as a “pre-announcement” effect. In addition to this effect, how-
ever, the actual realization of the monetary policy shock also impacts the foreign currencies’ excess
returns by affecting the ﬁnanciers’ balance sheets, leading to what we call a “post-announcement”
effect. Indeed, we show that within our model, an ex post adoption of an expansionary monetary
policy (corresponding to an interest rate reduction by the Fed) further increases foreign currencies’
excess returns.
To empirically study currency risk premia around announcement days, we use 20 years of high-
frequency data for the ten most traded currencies. We ﬁnd that, in line with our theoretical model, a
simple trading strategy that is short the U.S. dollar and long the other currencies yields economically
signiﬁcant returns on announcement days compared to non-announcement days. Furthermore, we
document that returns earned on the eight announcement days account for a signiﬁcant fraction
of the currencies’ yearly excess returns. Crucially, we also ﬁnd that in contrast to the equity index
market, currencies exhibit excess returns that span the entire announcement day, consisting of a
pre- and a post-announcement component, as predicted by our model.
Since investors do not typically trade in individual currencies but rather go long and short a
portfolio of currencies simultaneously, we also test our model’s predictions for currency portfolios
sorted based on their forward discounts. Our empirical results indicate that excess returns earned
on announcement days are larger for currency portfolios with higher interest rates, an observation
consistent with our model. In particular, we ﬁnd that a portfolio consisting of currencies with low
interest rates earns an average daily return of 5.71 basis points (bps) during days when the Federal
Reserve makes an announcement, compared to an average of−0.55bps on all other days. This differ-
ence becomes larger for the portfolio consisting of high interest rate currencies, with a daily return of
16.83bps on announcement days compared to 1.66bps on non-announcement days. This 15.17bps
difference is not only highly statistically signiﬁcant (with a t-statistic of 2.43), but also translates into
economically meaningful returns. In particular, the fact that even a retail investor in FX markets can
take leverage ratios of up to 100 to 1 (or trade on a 1% margin) means that holding the high interest
rate currency portfolio for the eight announcement days during the year yields a 136% annual return
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on a USD 100 investment.4
Our explanation for these large returns around announcement days is that they reﬂect a premium
for heightenedmonetary policy uncertainty ormore generally a tightening of ﬁnanciers’ risk-bearing
capacity. Using different proxies for monetary policy uncertainty (such as an implied volatility index
from Treasury futures options and an uncertainty measure constructed from survey forecasts about
the future federal funds rate), we ﬁnd that an increase in market participants’ uncertainty is indeed
associated with higher returns around FOMC announcement days.
We then focus on the so called post-announcement effect by testing the impact of the realization
of monetary policy shocks on currency returns. Using a monetary policy indicator constructed from
high-frequency data on ﬁve-year Treasury futures, we ﬁnd that the largest returns are materialized
during announcement days when the Fed adopts an expansionary monetary policy. This result,
which is robust to using alternative measures for the stance of monetary policy, is consistent with
our theoretical framework which predicts that currency excess returns should increase even further
when the federal funds rate is decreased.
To test whether similar effects exist for other central banks, we collect the exact timing of mon-
etary policy announcements for the different countries in our sample. We ﬁnd a very strong effect
for announcements made by the Bank of Japan, with a pattern that is virtually identical to that of the
FOMC. However, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant effect for other central banks.
We conclude the paper by running a series of robustness checks. First, we redo the analysis
for winsorized data to ensure that our results are not driven by outliers in the sample. Second, to
overcome concerns regarding the sample size, we compute small sample standard errors through a
bootstrap exercise. In another bootstrap exercise, we sample randomly from the distribution of non-
announcement returns to test whether we can generate returns similar in size to those observed on
announcement dates. These exercises all indicate that our empirical results are robust and econom-
ically meaningful. Finally, we show that our trading strategy is highly proﬁtable (with annualized
Sharpe ratios of up to 0.5) even when, by adjusting for bid-ask spreads, transaction costs are taken
into account.
Related Literature: Our paper belongs to the growing literature that documents sizable responses
of various asset classes to macroeconomic announcements. For instance, Ho¨rdahl, Remolona, and
Valente (2015) study high-frequency movements in bond yields around macroeconomic announce-
ments and document strongmovements not only in yields but also in bond risk premia as a response
to revisions to expectations about short-term interest rates. Similarly, Jones, Lamont, and Lums-
daine (1998) study realized bond excess returns aroundmacroeconomic news releases (inﬂation and
labor market); Savor and Wilson (2013) focus on (unconditional) excess equity returns in response
to inﬂation, labor market, and FOMC releases; Beber and Brandt (2006) use Treasury Future options
to assess how state price density changes around macroeconomic announcements; and Savor and
4A start capital of USD 100 yields an investment of USD 10, 000, thus obtaining 10, 000 × 1.00178 = 10, 136. This is a
signiﬁcantly larger rate of return compared to the equitymarket, where Lucca andMoench (2015) report a 50bps return per
announcement. Since typical leverage ratios in equity markets are around 2 to 1, this would imply a 8% return.
3
Wilson (2014) document that systematic market risk prices risky assets (including foreign exchange
portfolios) well on announcement days. Most recently, Lucca and Moench (2015) study S&P 500
index returns ahead of scheduled announcements and ﬁnd that the unconditional announcement
day returns are due to a pre-FOMC drift rather than returns earned at the announcement.5
Even though closely related, our paper departs from this literature along several important di-
mensions. First, in contrast to Lucca and Moench (2015) who ﬁnd that returns in the equity mar-
ket are earned entirely in the 24-hour window before the announcement, we document that cur-
rency excess returns span the entire announcement day, thus consisting of a pre- as well as a post-
announcement component. Second, we also observe signiﬁcant differences in returns depending on
the direction of the interest rate change adopted by the Fed. Finally, we provide a theoretical frame-
work that interprets the documented pre- and post-announcement excess returns as, respectively, a
compensation for intermediaries’ exposure to monetary policy uncertainty prior to announcements
and the ex post impact of the monetary policy shock on their balance sheets.
Our paper is related to the theoretical asset pricing literature that studies the interplay of market
frictions and exchange rates. For example, in the context of a model of the international banking
system, Bruno and Shin (2015) show that local currency appreciation results in lower credit risk and,
hence, expanded bank lending capacity. Our theoretical framework is most closely related to the re-
cent work of Gabaix and Maggiori (2015) who present a model of exchange rate determination based
on capital ﬂows in imperfect ﬁnancial markets. They show that, in the presence of intermediation
frictions, shocks to ﬁnanciers’ risk-bearing capacity affects the level and volatility of exchange rates.
Given our different focus, we depart from the framework of Gabaix andMaggiori (2015) by studying a
model in which ﬁnanciers may be uncertain about the future path of monetary policy and show that
such an uncertainty plays a ﬁrst-order role in determining currency excess returns prior to central
bank announcements.
Outline: The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we formulate a model of
exchange rate determination around central bank announcement days. Section 3 describes the data
on which we base our analysis. Our main empirical ﬁndings are presented in Section 4. Section 5
concludes. An alternative theoretical framework and the proofs are presented in the Appendix.
2 Theoretical Framework
In this section, we present a parsimoniousmodel of exchange rate determination that forms the basis
of our analysis. Ourmodel builds on the recent framework of Gabaix andMaggiori (2015) by allowing
for monetary policy uncertainty.
5In parallel, a large empirical literature, going back to Fleming and Remolona (1999) and Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold,
and Vega (2003), studies the impact of monetary policy announcements on second moments in foreign exchange markets.
The main ﬁnding of this literature is that policy surprises increase realized exchange rate volatility. See Neely (2011) for a
survey of this literature.
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2.1 Model
Consider a discrete-time economy that lasts for two periods t = 0, 1. The economy consists of two
countries, each populated with a unit mass of investors and with its own currency. For expositional
simplicity, we refer to one of the countries as the United States and to its currency as the dollar.
Investors in each country can trade a risk-free bond that is denominated in their domestic currency.
We useR andR∗ to denote the interest rates in theUnited States and the foreign country, respectively,
and deﬁne the exchange rate et as the quantity of dollars that can be bought by one unit of the foreign
currency at time t.
At any given period, investors in each country have a downward-sloping demand for assets de-
nominated in the other country’s currency. More speciﬁcally, we assume that U.S. investors have
a time t demand of ft/et for assets denominated in the foreign currency, which they fund by an
offsetting position −ft in dollars. Similarly, we assume that foreign investors have a time t demand
of dtet for dollar-denominated assets, funded by the offsetting position−dt in their currency.6
In addition to the investors, the economy is populated by a unit mass of identical, risk-neutral
ﬁnanciers. Unlike the investors, these ﬁnanciers can trade in the domestic bonds of both countries.
As such, their main role is to act as intermediaries between investors in the two countries by taking
the other side of their currency demands, at a proﬁt. The representative ﬁnancier enters the market
with no capital of her own, which implies that her balance sheet at the end of t = 0 consists of −Q
dollars andQ/e0 units of the foreign currency.7 Consequently, the representative ﬁnancier’s expected
proﬁt (expressed in dollars) is given by
E[V ] = E
[
e1
e0
R∗ −R
]
Q, (1)
where recall thatR andR∗ denote the interest rates in the U.S. and the foreign country, respectively.
As our main point of departure from the framework of Gabaix and Maggiori (2015), we assume
that ﬁnanciers may be uncertain about the interest rate in the U.S. when taking their positions.
Formally, we assume that R is a random variable, with mean E[R] and standard deviation σR, whose
realization is determined at t = 1. This assumption captures the idea that, prior to an FOMC an-
nouncement, agents may be uncertain about the future stance of monetary policy, in which case
σR > 0. On the other hand, σR = 0 during “normal” periods with no scheduled monetary policy
announcements, as agents are certain that the interest rate will remain unchangedwithin the period.
An immediate implication of equation (1) is that whenever the uncovered interest rate parity
(UIP) condition is not satisﬁed (i.e.,E[R∗e1/e0−R] = 0), each ﬁnancier takes inﬁnitely large positions
in one of the currencies, unless some friction limits her ability to do so. We model the presence
of such intermediation frictions by assuming that ﬁnanciers are subject to a limited commitment
constraint: at the end of t = 0, each ﬁnancier can divert a fraction ω of the funds, which cannot be
recovered by her lenders. This constraint implies that the ﬁnancier can hold a position of sizeQ/e0 in
6Such demand may arise due to various reasons, such as trade or portfolio ﬂows.
7As we show later on, our assumptions guarantee that the representative ﬁnancier always shorts the dollar, i.e.,Q ≥ 0.
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the foreign currency only if her expected proﬁts are large enough to guarantee that she does not divert
the funds; that is, E[V ] ≥ ωQ. Following Gabaix and Maggiori (2015), we assume that the divertable
fraction is given by ω = ΓQ/e0, where Γ = γvar(e1) for some constant γ ≥ 0. This assumption
captures the idea that the ﬁnancier’s outside option increases in the “complexity” — that is, the size
and volatility — of her position.8
To summarize, the representative ﬁnancier faces the following optimization problem:
max
Q
E[V ]
s.t. E[V ] ≥ ΓQ2/e0,
(2)
where V = (R∗e1/e0 −R)Q and Γ captures the ﬁnancier’s “risk-bearing capacity.” When Γ = 0, the
ﬁnancier is unconstrained and can take arbitrarily large currency positions. However, as Γ increases
(for example, due to an increase in the anticipated volatility of future exchange rates), the ﬁnancier’s
outside option becomes more attractive, which in turn reduces her ability to borrow from the in-
vestors.
The equilibrium of the simple economy described above is deﬁned in a straightforward manner.
It consists of the tuple (e0, e1, Q) of exchange rates and currency positions such that (i) the repre-
sentative ﬁnancier chooses Q in order to maximize her expected proﬁt, taking the exchange rates as
given; and (ii) the currency market clears. In particular, the net demand for dollars is equal to zero in
both periods:
d0e0 − f0 −Q = 0 (3)
d1e1 − f1 +RQ = 0. (4)
Note that for the market clearing condition (4) we are assuming that the representative ﬁnancier
unwinds her dollar position by purchasing RQ dollars at the end of t = 1 and keeps her proﬁts (or
losses) in the foreign currency.
2.2 Equilibrium Exchange Rates
We now provide a characterization of equilibrium exchange rates in the economy described above.
Throughout, we assume that dt is deterministic and constant over time, i.e., d1 = d0 = d. Further-
more, we assume that f1 is independent ofR and thatE[f1] = f0. These assumptions have no bearing
on the model’s economic insights, though they simplify the algebraic expressions considerably. Fi-
nally, we assume that the expected interest rate in theU.S. is smaller than that of the foreign country’s
(that is, E[R] < R∗), an assumption that implies that the dollar and the foreign currency serve as the
funding and investment currencies, respectively.
8We model the presence of frictions in our baseline framework by means of a limited commitment constraint. However,
our model’s main insights hold more generally and are not sensitive to the speciﬁc nature of this constraint. In particular,
any constraint that induces a downward-sloping demand curve for risk taking by ﬁnanciers results in similar implications.
In Appendix A, we show that the model’s insights remain unchanged if we instead assume that the ﬁnanciers are subject to
a value-at-risk constraint.
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To characterize the equilibrium, recall that the representative ﬁnancier chooses her positionQ in
order to maximize her expected proﬁt, subject to the limited commitment constraint. It is easy to
verify that the constraint in (2) always binds. As a result,
Q =
1
Γ
E [R∗e1 −Re0] . (5)
Replacing for Q in the market clearing conditions (3) and (4) from the above equation thus implies
that the ﬁnancier’s short position in the dollar is
Q =
f0 (R
∗ − E[R])
Γd+ (1 +R∗)E[R]
(6)
and that equilibrium exchange rates are given by
e0 = d
−1f0 + d−1f0
(
R∗ − E[R]
Γd+ (1 +R∗)E[R]
)
(7)
e1 = d
−1f1 −Rd−1f0
(
R∗ − E[R]
Γd+ (1 +R∗)E[R]
)
. (8)
These equations illustrate that the ﬁnanciers’ risk-bearing capacity plays a key role in determining
equilibrium exchange rates. For instance, a reduction in the ﬁnanciers’ risk-bearing capacity (that is,
an increase in Γ) restricts their ability to take larger positions by tightening their constraints, which
in turn results in dollar’s appreciation at t = 0 and a depreciation at t = 1. On the other hand,
when Γ = 0, ﬁnanciers face no risk constraints, and hence are willing to take inﬁnitely large positions
whenever expected returns of shorting the dollar are positive. As a result, the risk premium on the
foreign currency is entirely eliminated in equilibrium. Indeed, equations (7) and (8) imply that if
Γ = 0, then E[R∗e1/e0] = E[R], which means that UIP is satisﬁed.
We end this discussion by remarking that ﬁnanciers’ risk-bearing capacity is itself an endogenous
variable. Therefore, to complete the characterization of equilibrium, we next relate Γ to the exoge-
nous parameters of the model. From (8), it is easy to see that exchange rate volatility at t = 1 is
var(e1) = d
−2
(
σ2f +
(
b
Γ + c
)2
σ2R
)
, (9)
where b = d−1f0(R∗ − E[R]) and c = d−1(1 + R∗)E[R]. This equation, coupled with the fact that
Γ = γvar(e1), implies that the representative ﬁnancier’s risk-bearing capacity is determined as the
solution to the following equation:
d2Γ = γσ2f + γ
(
b
Γ + c
)2
σ2R, (10)
thus completing the characterization. In addition, equation (10) illustrates that the risk-bearing
capacity of the ﬁnanciers depends on both “fundamental volatility” (that is, volatility in the investors’
demand for and supply of currencies, captured in our model by σ2f ) and monetary policy uncertainty
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(captured by σ2R). As a result, as we show in the next subsection, an increase in either type of uncer-
tainty tightens the ﬁnanciers’ constraint with ﬁrst-order implications for equilibrium exchange rates
and excess returns.
2.3 Monetary Policy Uncertainty
We now characterize how uncertainty about the future stance of monetary policy in the U.S. impacts
the foreign currency’s excess returns, φ = R∗e1/(Re0). We start our analysis with a simple lemma:
Lemma 1. ∂Γ/∂σR > 0.
In other words, an increase in monetary policy uncertainty reduces ﬁnanciers’ risk-bearing ca-
pacity. This is due to the fact that any form of uncertainty (whether it is about investors’ currency
demand as inGabaix andMaggiori (2015) or about interest rates), increases ﬁnanciers’ expectation of
future exchange rate volatility at t = 1, thus increasing the perceived riskiness of their short position
in the dollar.
The next lemma shows that a reduction in ﬁnanciers’ risk-bearing capacity increases the foreign
currency’s excess returns:
Lemma 2. ∂φ/∂Γ > 0.
The intuition underlying this result is also straightforward: increasing Γ tightens the ﬁnanciers’
constraint in (2), thus limiting the extent to which they are able to short the dollar. As a result,
for currency markets to clear in both periods, the foreign currency has to depreciate at t = 0 and
appreciate at t = 1, increasing its excess returns.
Noting that σR impacts the foreign currency’s excess returns only through Γ, the juxtaposition of
Lemmas 1 and 2 leads to the following proposition, which serves as our main result in this section:
Proposition 1. An increase in monetary policy uncertainty in the U.S. increases the foreign currency’s
excess returns, that is, ∂φ/∂σR > 0.
This result thus suggests that prior to FOMC announcements, excess returns on the foreign cur-
rency should be higher relative to normal periods with no pre-scheduled announcements. This is
a consequence of the fact that, right before an announcement, ﬁnanciers who short the dollar are
subject to the risk induced by a potential change in interest rates — a risk that is above and beyond
the usual risk they face during normal times. Given their downward-sloping demand for risk-taking
(captured in this model by means of the limited commitment constraint), ﬁnanciers are willing to
bear this extra risk only if they are compensated with higher returns. These higher excess returns
materialize by the foreign currency’s depreciation at t = 0 and its appreciation at t = 1.
Our next result shows how the foreign currency’s excess returns depend on the interest rate in the
foreign country:
Proposition 2. The foreign currency’s expected excess return is increasing in the foreign country’s in-
terest rate, that is, ∂E[φ]/∂R∗ > 0. Furthermore, the increase in excess returns in response to monetary
policy uncertainty is higher for currencies with higher interest rates, i.e., ∂2E[φ]/∂R∗∂σR > 0.
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A higher interest rate in the foreign country impacts excess returns via two separate channels.
First, there is the mechanical effect that increasing R∗ increases the interest rate differential R∗/R
between the two countries, which makes shorting the dollar more attractive. Consequently, as is
evident from (6), ﬁnanciers take larger positions in equilibrium. This increase in position size results
in an exchange rate adjustment that reduces e1/e0. The key observation here is that due to ﬁnanciers’
limited risk-bearing capacity, the adjustment in exchange rates does not offset the increase in R∗/R
one for one. As a result, the overall excess returns of the foreign currency increases inR∗.
Increasing R∗ also impacts excess returns through a second channel. This channel, which is
absent in the baseline framework of Gabaix and Maggiori (2015) with σR = 0, works through changes
in ﬁnanciers’ risk-bearing capacity Γ. In particular, when uncertainty about monetary policy is non-
trivial, the larger position Q taken by the ﬁnanciers in response to a higher interest rate differential
increases the anticipated exchange rate volatility at t = 1. As a result, a higher R∗ increases Γ, which
means that the ﬁnanciers have to be compensated even more to be willing to bear this extra risk.
More importantly, the second part of Proposition 2 establishes that the impact ofmonetary policy
uncertainty on excess returns (characterized in Proposition 1) is not the same for all currencies.
Rather, returns that are earned in compensation for higher monetary policy uncertainty are larger
for currencies with higher interest rates.
2.4 Monetary Policy Shock
Our results thus far focused on how uncertainty about interest rates in the U.S. impacts exchange
rates and excess returns. Given that this uncertainty is resolved at t = 1, all the effects characterized
so far work through ﬁnanciers’ t = 0 expectations about future exchange rates. As our next result, we
show that in addition to these expectations-driven effects, the actual realization of R also has an im-
pact on the foreign currency’s (ex post) excess returns. To capture this so called “post-announcement
effect,” we study how the ex post choice of interest rate by the Fed impacts excess returns, while
keeping E[R] and σR constant.
We start by noting that the realization of R at t = 1 can have no impact on variables that are
determined at t = 0. In fact, as is evident from equations (6) and (7), the exchange rate e0 and the
size of ﬁnanciers’ position Q are independent of R’s realization. However, by equation (8), a rate
reduction by the Fed results in a further appreciation of the foreign currency at t = 1. As a result,
∂φ/∂R < 0, which means that an interest rate reduction (increase) by the Fed increases (reduces) the
foreign currency’s excess returns. Furthermore, we have the following result:
Proposition 3. An interest rate reduction (increase) by the Fed increases (reduces) the difference be-
tween excess returns on announcement and non-announcement days, that is, ∂2φ/∂R∂σR < 0.
The juxtaposition of this result with Proposition 1 thus implies that not only the foreign currency
exhibits higher excess returns on announcement days relative to non-announcement days, but also
that this difference would be even higher if, ex post, the Fed adopts a policy of monetary easing.
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3 Data
We work with tick-by-tick high frequency data that runs from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2010.
There are eight scheduled FOMCmeetings in one year. This leaves uswith 136 FOMCannouncement
days and 4,107 days with no pre-scheduled FOMC announcements. Out of the 136 announcement
days, the target federal funds rate was increased in 30 instances, while it was decreased in 22 occa-
sions. On the remaining 84 days, the target rate remained unchanged.
High-FrequencyCurrencyData: Thehigh-frequency spot exchange rate data for Australia, Canada,
Euro, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK, all vis-a`-vis the U.S. dollar, are
from Olsen & Associates. We focus on these so called “G10” currencies, because they are the most
heavily traded (Bank for International Settlements, 2015). The raw data consists of all interbank bid
and ask indicative quotes for the exchange rates to the nearest even second. After ﬁltering the data for
outliers, the log price at each ﬁve-minute tick is obtained by linearly interpolating from the average
of the log bid and log ask quotes for the two closest ticks.9 For our benchmark results, we calculate
returns by sampling data at 4pm Eastern Time (ET).
Spot and Forward Data: To calculate currency excess returns, we combine our high-frequency
spot data with the daily data for spot exchange rates and one-month forward rates (versus the U.S.
dollar) obtained from BBI and WM/Reuters (via Datastream). We denote spot and forward rates
in logs by st and fwt, respectively. The log excess return rxt+1 of purchasing a foreign currency in
the forward market and then selling it in the spot market after one month is rxt+1 = fwt − st+1.
This excess return can also be stated as the log forward discount minus the change in the spot rate:
rxt+1 = fwt−st−Δst+1. Since covered interest rate parity (CIP) holds at daily and lower frequencies,
the forward discount is equal to the interest rate differential, that is, fwt − st ≈ r∗t − rt, where r∗
and r respectively denote the foreign and domestic nominal risk-free rates over the maturity of the
contract.10 To calculate daily excess returns, we sample the spot rate at different points in time using
the high-frequency data.
Volatilities: To obtain measures for intra-day realized volatility, we ﬁrst calculate spot FX changes
sampled at ﬁve-minute intervals and obtain the realized variance over a rolling one-hour window as
the respective sum of squared changes. We then calculate realized volatility by taking the square root
of realized variance.
FOMCAnnouncements: For a high-frequency analysis, it is important to know exactly when FOMC
decisions become known to market participants. Unlike other macroeconomic announcements that
are released at very precise times, FOMC announcements are made around, but not precisely at,
9We follow the literature and take ﬁve-minute intervals as opposed to higher frequencies, in order to mitigate the effect
of spurious serial correlation stemming from microstructure noise.
10The daily data from Datastream is sampled at 4pm London time. We verify that the daily data from WM/Reuters and
our sampled high-frequency data are virtually identical.
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215pm ET. We follow Fleming and Piazzesi (2005) and collect precise announcement times from the
Bloomberg newswire, thoughwith some abuse of terminology, we use 215pmand the announcement
time interchangeably.
Monetary Policy Indicators: To construct our benchmark indicator for monetary policy shocks, we
use the methodology proposed by Rogers, Scotti, and Wright (2015), which measures the change
in ﬁve-year Treasury future prices from 15 minutes before the time of the FOMC announcement to
1 hour 45 minutes afterwards. A positive value for this indicator corresponds to an expansionary
change in policy. Our reliance on longer maturity bonds to measure the effect of monetary shocks
(as opposed to using federal funds futures as in Kuttner (2001) or Bernanke and Kuttner (2005)) is due
to the well-known fact that over the past two decades FOMC announcements concerning the target
federal funds rate have been largely anticipated by themarket (Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Swanson, 2007).
As an alternative indicator for monetary policy shocks, we use the composite measure suggested
by Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2015). This measure is
constructed by extracting the principal component of changes in federal funds futures and eurodol-
lar futures for different horizons spanning one year in a 30-minute window around the FOMC an-
nouncement.
Uncertainty Indices: As our benchmark index formarket participants’ uncertainty aboutmonetary
policy, we use the implied volatility index extracted from one-month options on 30-year Treasury
futures (akin to the VIX), henceforth Treasury Implied Volatility or TIV (Choi, Mueller, and Vedolin,
2014). In our robustness analysis, we proxy monetary policy uncertainty with two alternative mea-
sures known as EPU and DiB FF. EPU is the economic policy uncertainty index of Baker, Bloom,
and Davis (2015), whereas DiB FF is a cross-sectional mean standard deviation from forecasts of the
federal funds rate available from Bloomberg.
Finally, as a proxy for market participants’ appetite for risk, we use the VIX index of implied
volatility in the stock market (Pan and Singleton, 2008; Adrian and Shin, 2010; Miranda-Agrippino
and Rey, 2015).
4 Empirical Analysis
This section contains our main empirical results. We start our analysis by comparing the character-
istics of returns on individual currencies on announcement and non-announcement days. We then
focus on currency portfolios sorted on interest rates and test ourmodel’s predictions. A number of ro-
bustness checks conﬁrm that (i) returns to a trading strategy that is short the U.S. dollar and long the
other currencies are (on average) signiﬁcantly larger on days with an FOMC policy announcement;
(ii) there is a signiﬁcant drift prior to the announcement; (iii) overall returns are higher when the Fed
adopts an expansionary policy; and (iv) returns increase with the currency’s interest rate differential
vis-a`-vis the U.S.
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4.1 Individual Currency Returns & Volatilities
Table 1 presents average daily excess returns of the G10 currencies (in bps) on days with and without
a scheduled FOMC announcement, sampled at three different times. Panel A samples returns at
4pm London time, which corresponds to the ofﬁcial WM/Reuters ﬁxing time for currencies. The
WM/Reuters daily closing rates — which are announced just after 4pm London time based on prices
that take place in the one-minute window around 4pm (that is, from 15:59:30 to 16:00:30) — are
widely used as benchmark exchange rates (similar to the LIBOR) for customer trades in the London
and New York markets. Panel B samples returns at 215pm ET, which is the time when the FOMC
announces its monetary policy decisions. Finally, Panel C of Table 1 samples returns at 4pm ET,
which corresponds to the closing time of the stock market in New York.
[Insert Table 1 here.]
There are several noteworthy observations. First, when sampled at 4pm ET, daily returns are
signiﬁcantly larger on announcement days relative to non-announcement days. For example, the
average daily return of the Australian dollar (AUD) on announcement days is 21.76bps, compared to
0.98bps on non-announcement days, amounting to a statistically signiﬁcant difference of 20.78bps
(with a t-statistic of 2.72). In fact, the table illustrates that consistent with our model’s prediction
in Proposition 1, differences in returns between announcement and non-announcement days are
signiﬁcant for all currencies except for the Japanese yen, the Swiss franc, and the Norwegian krona.
Second, since currency excess returns consist of an interest rate and an exchange rate component,
it is natural to ask which of the two factors contributes the most to the observed returns. Our results
indicate that most of the return is earned due to changes in the foreign exchange as opposed to
the interest rate differential. Line “fx” in Panel C, which denotes how much of the daily return is
earned as a consequence of changes in the foreign exchange, suggests that almost the entire return is
attributable to the exchange rate change. This observation is consistent with our model’s prediction
that announcement day excess returns can materialize even when there are no changes in interest
rates, an issue that we explore in further detail in the following subsections.
Third, we note that differences between announcement and non-announcement days are larger
for currencies that have higher interest rate differentials vis-a`-vis the U.S. For example, the difference
between announcement and non-announcement day returns for the Australian and New Zealand
dollars, two typical investment currencies, is about 20bps, which is statistically different from zero in
both cases. In contrast, the Japanese yen and the Swiss franc, two typical funding currencies, have
much smaller differences, neither of which are statistically different from zero. This ﬁnding is in line
with our theoretical prediction in Proposition 2, according to which currencies with larger interest
rate differentials should exhibit larger excess returns on announcement days.
Finally, we can explore how returns compare across different sampling times. Lucca and Moench
(2015) report that most of the S&P500’s return is earned in the 24-hour window right before the
announcement at 215pm ET, an effect that they refer to as the “pre-announcement” drift. Foreign
exchange returns, however, seem to follow a different pattern. In particular, as indicated in Panel B of
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Table 1, when sampled at 215pmET, the difference between announcement and non-announcement
day returns is not statistically signiﬁcant for any of the currencies. Similarly, if sampled at the London
ﬁxing time, none of the currencies — except for the Australian dollar and British pound — exhibit
returns on announcement days that are statistically different from those on other days.11 Taken
together, these observations suggest that, different from the equity market, currencies exhibit excess
returns that span the entire announcement day, consisting of a pre- as well as a post-announcement
component. Viewed through the prism of our model, the pre-announcement component is a risk
premiumearned in compensation formonetary policy uncertainty, whereas the post-announcement
component depends on the actual realization of the monetary policy adopted by the Fed.
We end this discussion by recalling that one prediction of ourmodel is that exchange rate volatility
plays a key role in determining currency excess returns (via impacting the ﬁnanciers’ risk-bearing
capacity). Figure 1 plots the daily movement of average realized volatility of the G10 currencies’
exchange rates on announcement and non-announcement days. The numbers in parentheses cor-
respond to the t-statistic of a test of zeromean difference between realized variances in the one-hour
window around 215pm ET.
[Insert Figure 1 here.]
As the ﬁgure indicates, realized volatility on announcement days before and after the announcement
is low and statistically indistinguishable from the realized volatility at corresponding times on non-
announcement days. However, around the time of the announcement, realized volatility spikes
considerably for all currencies and is statistically different from the volatility sampled at the same
time on non-announcement days.
4.2 Currency Portfolios
In the remainder of this section, we focus our attention on currency portfolios, asmost traders do not
invest in single currencies. In particular, in order to diversify away idiosyncratic currency risks, many
traders take a long position in a number of high-interest rate currencies while shorting currencies
with low interest rates (Pedersen, 2015).
Motivated by our earlier observation that individual currencies with higher interest rate differen-
tial vis-a`-vis the U.S. exhibit larger returns on announcement days, we construct currency portfolios
that are sorted on their forward discount, as is customary in the literature (see, e.g., Lustig and
Verdelhan (2007) and Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2011), among many others). To this end,
we allocate currencies into three portfolios based on their observed forward discounts fwt − st, or,
equivalently, their interest rate differentials at the end of each month t.12 Portfolios are ranked in
increasing interest rate order, with pf1 (pf3) denoting the portfolio consisting of the three currencies
with the lowest (highest) interest rates. We calculate daily log excess returns of individual currencies
11Note that the time difference between London and New York can range between 4 to 6 hours throughout the year, as a
result of the adoption of daylight-saving time. Nevertheless, throughout the year, the London ﬁxing time of 4pm is before
the FOMC announcement time at 215pm ET.
12Recall that since covered interest rate parity holds at daily and lower frequencies, the forward discount is equal to the
interest rate differential
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using the daily interest rate differentials and daily log exchange rate changes, assuming that the
interest rate differential is earned linearly over the month. Portfolio returns are then calculated as
the average of the currency excess returns in each portfolio as in Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan
(2011). Panel A of Table 2 presents the resulting summary statistics, withDOL denoting the portfolio
that is short the U.S. dollar and long all other currencies.
[Insert Table 2 and Figure 2 here.]
Our results conﬁrm the well-known empirical pattern that, when averaged over all days, low in-
terest rate currencies earn lower average returns than high interest rate currencies: in our sample, the
low interest rate portfolio, pf1, earns a daily return of −0.35bps (with a t-statistic of −0.41), whereas
the high interest rate portfolio, pf3, earns an average daily return of 2.15bps (with a t-statistic of 2.16).
The DOL portfolio has a daily return of 0.73bps, which is statistically insigniﬁcant (with a t-statistic
of 0.94). Panel A of Table 2 also indicates that corresponding annualized Sharpe ratios are large in
absolute value for high interest rate currencies. In particular, while pf1 only generates an annualized
Sharpe ratio of−0.1, pf3 has a Sharpe ratio of 0.53.
Next, we study whether high and low interest rate currency portfolios exhibit different excess
returns on announcement days compared to non-announcement days. Panels B and C of Table 2
present the main results. The average daily return on the low interest rate portfolio is 5.71bps on
announcement days compared to −0.55bps on non-announcement days. This 6.26bps difference is
not statistically signiﬁcant, with a t-statistic of 1.17. On the other hand, the average daily return of the
high interest rate currency portfolio is 16.83bps on announcement days compared to 1.67bps on non-
announcement days, a 15.17bps differencewhich is signiﬁcantly different from zero (with a t-statistic
of 2.43). We also note that in contrast to the unconditional average taken over the entire sample
(as presented in panel A of Table 2), the DOL portfolio features a large and statistically signiﬁcant
return on announcement days — 12.45bps, with a t-statistic of 2.43 — whereas the return on non-
announcement days is insigniﬁcant, with a t-statistic of 0.60. The difference of 12.10bps between
the announcement and non-announcement days is highly statistically different from zero with a
t-statistic of 2.34. Notably, the large increases in mean returns around announcement days is not
accompanied by an equally large increase in realized risk, as measured by realized volatility, since
annualized Sharpe ratios are signiﬁcantly larger on announcement than non-announcement days.13
Our empirical results thus indicate that a sizable portion of the currency portfolios’ average yearly
returns is earned on FOMC announcement days. For instance, the average yearly return on the high
interest rate portfolio is 252 × 2.147 = 541bps, of which almost 25% (or 8 × 16.829 = 134bps) is
earned on the eight FOMC announcement days. To assess the economic signiﬁcance of this result,
we compare these numbers to those reported for the equitymarket. In terms of size, the 17bps earned
on pf3 seem much smaller than the 50bps documented for the equity market (Lucca and Moench,
2015). However, the leverage investors can take in the FXmarket is substantially higher than in equity
13Annualized announcement and non-announcement Sharpe ratios are obtained by adjusting daily values for the yearly
frequency of FOMC announcements (eight out of 252 trading days). Thus, the adjustment factor is
√
8 and
√
244 for the
announcement and non-announcement Sharpe ratios, respectively.
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markets. For example, while standard leverage ratios in the equity market are around 2 to 1, retail
investors in the FXmarket can use a leverage of up to 100 to 1 (or trade on a 1%margin), meaning that
for any USD 100 invested, one can take a USD 10,000 bet.14 Therefore, a levered investor who starts
withUSD100 at the beginning of the year and earns 17bps per announcement day has a portfolio that
is worth USD 10,136 (≈ 10, 000 × 1.00178) at the end of the year, implying a return of 36% compared
to an 8% return in the equity market.
To see whether the announcement day returns are mainly earned before or after the announce-
ment, we next sample returns from 4pm the day before until 215pm on the day of the announcement
(or the exact timing) and then from the time of the announcement until 4pm on that day. Figure
2 plots pre- and post-announcement returns together with returns on non-announcement days.
As the plot suggests, most of the return is earned prior to the announcement, even though post-
announcement returns are also positive. On average, around 75% of the daily return is earned before
215pm, with the remaining 25% earned in the 105 minutes until the closing time. In terms of statis-
tical signiﬁcance, we ﬁnd that all pre-announcement returns except for pf1 are statistically different
from the non-announcement returns whereas post-announcement returns are not, suggesting that
most of the returns are earned prior to the announcement.
4.3 Time-Series of Currency Portfolios
We continue our investigation of currency excess returns around FOMC announcements by taking a
time-series perspective. This approach enables us to test our model’s theoretical predictions in more
detail.
4.3.1 Benchmark Results
As a ﬁrst exercise, we regress the three currency portfolios’ excess returns on a dummy which takes
the value of one on announcement days and zero otherwise:
rxit+1 = α0 + α1 ×Announcement Dummyt + t+1, i = 1, 2, 3,DOL. (11)
In this regression, the intercept α0 measures the corresponding portfolio’s mean return on non-
announcement days, whileα1 measures the spreadbetween announcement andnon-announcement
days’ mean returns. Our ﬁndings, reported in Panel A of Table 3, mirror those in Table 2, with
positive coefﬁcients for the announcement dummy for all portfolios. Furthermore, except for the low
interest rate portfolio pf1, the spread between announcement and non-announcement day returns is
signiﬁcant for all portfolios, with α1 = 15.20 (t-statistic of 2.47) for the high interest rate portfolio. The
estimates for the intercept α0 are not signiﬁcant except for pf3, implying that there is little return to
be earned on non-announcement days. Similarly, for theDOL portfolio, the announcement dummy
(α1 = 12.12) is statistically signiﬁcant whereas the intercept is not.
14For example, FXCM, which is the largest retail forex ﬁrm offers a 100 to 1 leverage ratio by default
(http://www.fxcm.com/uk/support/faq/margin-requirements). Similarly, OANDA, another large platform for FX trading,
offers a 1%margin on all exchange rates we study (http://fxtrade.oanda.co.uk/help/margin-rates).
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One prediction of our theoretical model is that the difference between returns on announcement
and non-announcement days should increase with the interest rate differential vis-a`-vis the U.S. (see
Proposition 2). Indeed, we ﬁnd that the estimated coefﬁcients increase from 6.27 for pf1 to 15.19 for
pf3.
[Insert Table 3 here.]
Next, we turn to testing two other predictions of our model, namely, that (i) higher monetary
policy uncertainty leads to larger currency excess returns around announcements (Proposition 1);
and (ii) an ex post decrease (increase) in interest rates in the U.S. raises (lowers) other currencies’
excess returns (Proposition 3).
To check whether higher monetary policy uncertainty indeed leads to higher returns, we regress
currency excess returns on the implied volatility index TIV, which serves as a proxy for monetary
policy uncertainty:
rxit+1 = α0 + α1 ×Announcement Dummyt × TIVt + α2 × TIVt + t+1, i = 1, 2, 3,DOL. (12)
In this regression, we are mainly interested in coefﬁcient α1, which measures the additional return
one can earn on announcement days relative to non-announcement days as TIV increases. The
results are reported in Panel B of Table 3. We ﬁnd that except for pf1, all estimated coefﬁcients for
α1 are statistically signiﬁcant and carry the expected positive sign, indicating that higher uncertainty
increases currency returns. Interestingly, monetary policy uncertainty does not seem to matter for
currency returns outside of announcement days as manifested in the insigniﬁcant estimates for α2.
Finally, we test for the relationship between currency excess returns and the resolution of mon-
etary policy uncertainty following the announcement. Recall that according to Proposition 3, the
difference between returns on announcement and non-announcement days should be larger when
the target federal funds rate is decreased. To test for this prediction, we regress the currency returns
on the indicator of monetary policy proposed by Rogers, Scotti, and Wright (2015) interacted with
the announcement dummy. This monetary policy indicator, which henceforth we refer to as MPI,
is deﬁned as the change in ﬁve-year Treasury future prices from 15 minutes before the time of the
FOMC announcement to 1 hour 45 minutes afterwards. Our rationale for relying on this indicator
as opposed to the change in the federal funds rate announced by the FOMC is twofold. First, within
our sample of 136 announcements, the federal funds rate was changed on only 52 occasions (cor-
responding to 30 and 22 rate hikes and reductions, respectively), thus leaving us with too small of a
sample. Second, given its overnight nature, changes in the federal funds rate is incapable of capturing
any longer term changes in (expected) interest rates as a result of the FOMC announcement. In
contrast, such potential changes are better reﬂected by the MPI due to its long horizon nature.
Panel C of Table 3 reports the results. Estimated coefﬁcients are positive and highly statistically
signiﬁcant for all portfolios with t-statistics ranging between 3.33 and 3.99, thus implying that cur-
rency excess returns are higher when the Fed adopts a policy ofmonetary easing, an observation that
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is consistent with our theoretical results.15
4.3.2 Alternative Measures
We now present additional results that indicate that the effects identiﬁed above are not driven by the
speciﬁc choice of howmarket participants’ uncertainty aboutmonetary policy or how the realization
of monetary policy shocks is measured.
In Table 4, we summarize estimated coefﬁcients from regressing currency portfolio excess returns
on two alternative proxies for monetary policy uncertainty, namely, the economic policy uncertainty
(EPU) index of Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2015) and DiB FF, which is a cross-sectional standard de-
viation from forecasts of the federal funds rate available from Bloomberg. As the table suggests,
the estimated coefﬁcient on the interaction term (that is, α1 in equation (12)) are similar to our
benchmark regressions: except for pf1, all estimated coefﬁcients are positive and signiﬁcant.
[Insert Table 4 here.]
To test the robustness of our results to the choice of indicator for monetary policy shocks, we
follow Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2015) and regress excess
returns on a composite measure of changes in interest rates at different maturities. This composite
measure is constructed by extracting the ﬁrst principal component of changes in federal funds and
eurodollar futures for different horizons spanning one year in a 30-minutewindow around the FOMC
announcement. The corresponding results, reported in Table 4, conﬁrm that the excess returns of all
currency portfolios increase with the realization of expansionary monetary policy shocks.
Yet another prediction of our model maintains that excess returns should increase in market
volatility in order to compensate the ﬁnanciers accordingly. To test for this prediction, we regress
excess returns on realized exchange rate volatility sampled from the high frequency data at 215pm
(as in equation (12)). The estimated coefﬁcients, also presented in Table 4, are all positive and highly
signiﬁcant, in line with the model’s prediction. Similarly, we also regress each portfolio’s excess
returns on the VIX index of implied volatility of S&P 500 index options, which serves as a proxy for
market participants’ appetite for risk (Pan and Singleton, 2008; Adrian and Shin, 2010). As expected,
the corresponding coefﬁcients are all positive and signiﬁcant, except for the low interest rate portfolio
pf1.
Overall, we ﬁnd strong empirical evidence for our model’s main predictions that (i) higher mone-
tary policy uncertainty leads to higher excess returns on currency portfolios; and (ii) an expansionary
monetary policy increases these returns even further.
4.4 Announcements by Other Central Banks
It is natural to ask whether announcements by other central banks have similar effects on currency
returns. To this end, we collect announcement dates for the major currencies we study either from
15Recall that a positive value for the MPI corresponds to an expansionary change in policy.
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Bloomberg (if available) or from the webpages of the respective central banks: Australia, England,
Japan, New Zealand, and Switzerland.16
As a ﬁrst exercise, we re-base all currency rates into the local currency, assuming there are no
violations of triangular arbitrage. We then build three portfolios based on interest rate differentials
vis-a`-vis the respective country and re-run the same exercise as for the FOMC announcement dates.
We do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant effects for other central bank announcements except for Japan, a
typical funding currency.17 In what follows, we ﬁrst discuss Japan’s monetary policy in more detail
and then present the results.
The Bank of Japan (BoJ) Policy Board meets once or twice a month for two days to discuss eco-
nomic developments inside and outside of the country. During these Monetary Policy Meetings,
the members produce a guideline for money market operations in inter-meeting periods, which is
written in terms of a target for the uncollateralized overnight call rate (the policy interest rate that
corresponds to the federal funds rate in the U.S.). This is the base rate which is charged when banks
that are part of the system provide one another with loans with a short maturity, usually a maturity
of one-day (overnight). The announcement of decisions are released right after the meeting and the
minutes themselves are released about a month after each meeting. We note that announcements
not only include interest rate decisions, but also the BoJ’s collective outlook on the economy as well
as guidance about future monetary policy decisions.
The uncollateralized call rate was lowered to virtually zero in February/March 1999, and with the
exception of a brief interest rate increase in fall 2000, the rate has remained at the zero lower bound
since then. So why would monetary policy announcements affect asset prices? Note that in addition
to setting the interest rate, quantitative easing in Japan entails two other measures: (i) setting the
target (reserves) of commercial banks at the BoJ in excess of required reserves; and (ii) setting the
size of outright purchases of long-term government bonds, private equity, and debt, such as asset-
backed securities.18
Monetary Policy Meeting dates are available from the Bank of Japan webpage since 1998. Spring
1998 coincides with the year when the BoJ gained independence from the government in its policy
making decisions and member appointments. To test for announcement day effects, we re-base all
exchange rates vis-a`-vis the Japanese yen and sort the currencies into three different portfolios based
on their interest rate differential. The results are presented in Table 5.
[Insert Table 5 here.]
The ﬁndings are strikingly similar to the ones for the Federal Reserve. On days when the BoJ
makes an announcement, the average daily return on the low interest rate portfolio is 16.94bps,
compared to −0.85bps on non-announcement days. This 17.79bps difference is highly statistically
16Most countries have either a very short history or a small number of pre-scheduled announcements, making any
meaningful statistical analysis impossible. For example, Canada only started a ﬁxed announcement schedule from 2001
onwards, Norway only met once per year until 2007, etc.
17In contrast, Brusa, Savor, and Wilson (2015) document that except for the Fed, there is no announcement effect on
global stock market indices from other central banks and that the Fed exerts an unique impact on global equity prices.
18See Kuttner (2014) for an excellent overview of Japan’s monetary policy.
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signiﬁcant, with a t-statistic of 2.78. For the high interest rate currency portfolio, the average return
is 20.52bps on announcement days compared to 2.50bps on non-announcement days; a 18.02bps
difference which is signiﬁcantly different from zero (t-statistic of 2.64). Annualized Sharpe ratios are
large and economically signiﬁcant, ranging from 0.77 for pf1 to 0.88 for pf3.
Similar to the results for the U.S., a sizable portion of the portfolios’ average yearly returns is
earned on the BoJ announcement days. For instance, the average yearly return on pf3 is 3.19 ×
252 = 803bps of which almost 40% (or 15 × 20.52 = 308bps) are earned on the 15 announcement
days. For the portfolio which is long all currencies and short the Japanese Yen (reported in the last
column in Table 5), announcement returns contribute to 80% of the annualized premium (18.16bps×
15/1.41bps× 252).
As a ﬁnal remark, we note that since Japanese yen is one of the most prominent funding curren-
cies, the similarity between the results for the BoJ and the FOMCshould not be considered surprising.
This similarity is also in line with ourmodel’s predictions, according to which the difference between
returns on announcement and non-announcement days increases in the interest rate differential
between the funding and investment currencies.
4.5 Robustness
We conclude this section by running several robustness checks. First, we redo the analysis for win-
sorized data to ensure that our results are not driven by outliers in the sample. Second, to over-
come concerns about the sample size, we compute small sample standard errors through a boot-
strap exercise. In a second bootstrap exercise, we sample randomly from the distribution of non-
announcement returns to test whether we can generate returns similar in size to those observed on
announcement dates. Finally, we check whether other macroeconomic announcements result in
similarly large returns as the ones we documented for FOMC announcements.
4.5.1 Winsorized Data
One may suspect that our results are determined by a few outliers, as some announcements are
more anticipated than others and it is well-known that currency returns occasionally experience
large crashes. To test for the sensitivity of our results to such outliers, we winsorize the sample by
discarding the top and bottom percentiles of the data. The results are reported in Table 6. We ﬁnd
that there is virtually no distinction between the means and standard deviations of winsorized and
non-winsorized returns (reported in Table 2) across interest rate sorted portfolios, thus indicating
that our results are not driven by a few outliers.
[Insert Table 6 here.]
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4.5.2 Bootstrapped Standard Errors and Random Sampling
Bootstrapped standard errors: A natural concern for the results reported in Table 3 is that, due
to the small number of observations, asymptotic theory may not provide a good approximation for
the distribution of the estimates. We address this concern with a bootstrap exercise, in which we
compute the small sample standard errors of the point estimates of the dummy variable regression.
In particular, we draw with replacement from the observed distribution, run regression (11), and
store the estimated coefﬁcients for each portfolio. The resulting empirical distributions are plotted
in Figure 4. We note that the mean is very similar to the estimated coefﬁcients for αˆ1 reported in
Table 3. Moreover, standard errors are also similar to those reported for the regression.
[Insert Figure 4 here.]
Random Sampling from non-FOMC Distribution: In another bootstrap exercise, we draw with
replacement a time-series with the length equal to the number of announcement days (136) from
the distribution of non-announcement day returns. We present the resulting announcement and
non-announcement day returns for the G10 currencies (Panel A) and the currency portfolios (Panel
B) in Table 7. In addition, we also include the 95 percentile of the bootstrap distribution and the
corresponding probabilities of observing a mean greater than the mean on announcement days by
drawing from the non-announcement day distribution. In line with the asymptotic results, themean
announcement return sampled at 4pm ET and observed in the data is much higher than the 95 per-
centile of the bootstrap distribution for all currencies except for JPY, CHF, andNOK. Correspondingly,
the probabilities of observing a higher mean when drawing from the non-announcement day data
are often negligibly small.
4.5.3 Transaction Costs
To adjust for transaction costs, we rerun our main regressions using net returns (after deducting
the bid-ask spread). The net return of a currency that enters the portfolio at month t and exits the
following month is computed as rxlongt+1 = fw
bid
t − saskt+1 for a long position and rxshortt+1 = −fwaskt + sbidt+1
for a short position. The results are reported in Table 8.
[Insert Table 8 here.]
While returns are lower than those reported in Table 2, they are still signiﬁcant as indicated by the
t-statistics (except for pf1). We conclude that shorting the U.S. dollar is proﬁtable even when ac-
counting for transaction costs.
4.5.4 Other Macroeconomic Announcements
Are othermacroeconomic announcements also able to generate similarly large returns as those earned
around FOMC announcements? To answer this question, we consider three major U.S. macroeco-
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nomic news releases: total non-farm payroll employment, the Producer Price Index, and the Con-
sumer Price Index, all published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).19 We build announcement
day dummy variables and check for larger conditional returns by means of the following regression:
rxit+1 = α0 + α1 ×Announcement DummyE, CPI, PPIt + t+1,
where rxit is the currency return and Announcement Dummy
E, CPI, PPI
t is a dummy variable that takes
the value of one on days when non-farm payroll employment (E), consumer price index (CPI), or
the producer price index (PPI) are announced. Results, reported in Table 9, show that none of these
announcements produce signiﬁcant results, thus indicating the unique role of monetary policy an-
nouncements in generating large excess returns on currency portfolios.
[Insert Table 9 here.]
5 Conclusions
In this paper we document that returns to a strategy that is short the U.S. dollar and long other
currencies are on average an order of magnitude larger on days that the FOMC makes a monetary
policy announcement compared to non-announcement days. This difference is increasing in the
forward discount of the currency and becomes signiﬁcantly larger when the Fed adopts a policy
of monetary easing. Moreover, using different proxies of monetary policy uncertainty, we ﬁnd that
currency returns increase when uncertainty is higher.
We interpret these observations through the lens of a minimalistic model of exchange rate deter-
mination in imperfect ﬁnancial markets. In particular, exchange rates are determined by the risk-
bearing capacity of ﬁnanciers who intermediate global demand for currencies. Within this frame-
work, we show that an increase in monetary policy uncertainty due to an impending FOMC an-
nouncement increases foreign currencies’ excess returns as a compensation to ﬁnanciers who bear
this extra risk. We also show that, consistent with our empirical observations, these risk premia are
increasing in the foreign currency’s interest rate differential. Currency excess returns on announce-
ment days materialize independent of whether the federal funds rate is, ex post, changed or not.
However, our model predicts that, in line with our empirical observations, the actual realization of
monetary policy shock also impacts currency excess returns with an expansionary (contractionary)
policy resulting in higher (lower) returns.
19We chose these three macroeconomic variables, as they are likely to be linked to monetary policy. We also checked for
other important macroeconomic news announcements such as initial claims for unemployment insurance, the Institute
for Supply Management’s manufacturing index, and housing starts but did not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant results.
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Figure 1. Foreign Exchange Realized Volatility
This ﬁgure plots average realized exchange rate volatility on FOMC announcement days (ann) and all
other days (non-ann). Realized volatilities are calculated from data sampled at ﬁve-minute frequency
over a one-hour window and are expressed in percent and annualized. The numbers in parentheses
are t-statistics of a test of equal means between announcement and non-announcement days
realized volatilities, calculated based on a one-hour window around the time of the announcement.
The data runs from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2010.
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Figure 2. Currency excess returns on FOMC announcement and non-announcement days
This ﬁgure plots average daily currency returns (sampled from 4pm to 4pm ET) on announcement
and non-announcement days for portfolios sorted on their interest rate differentials. Announcement
returns are split into pre-announcement (from 4pm to 215pm ET) and post-announcement returns
(from 215pm to 4pm ET). Pf1 and pf3 are, respectively, the portfolios with the lowest and highest
interest rate differentials. DOL denotes the average return of the three currency portfolios. The
sample runs from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2010.
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Figure 3. Currency excess returns ondayswith andwithout an announcement by theBankof Japan
This ﬁgure plots average daily currency returns (in basis points) for portfolios sorted on their interest
rate differential, with pf1denoting the portfoliowith the lowest interest rate differential. All currencies
are quoted vis-a`-vis the Japanese yen. JPY denotes the average return of the three currency portfolios.
The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics of a test of equal means between returns on BoJ and non-
BoJ announcement days. Data used is daily and runs from January 1, 1998 to December 31, 2010.
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Figure 4. Empirical distribution of bootstrapped regression coefﬁcients
This ﬁgure plots the empirical distribution for regression coefﬁcients αˆ1 in regression (11) for the
interest rate sorted portfolios pf1, pf2, and pf3, as well as the DOL portfolio. The sample period runs
from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2010.
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Table 2. Summary Statistics of Currency Portfolio Returns
This table reports summary statistics of currency returns on announcement (Panel B) and non-
announcement days (Panel C). Panel A reports summary statistics for all days. Portfolios are
sorted according to their interest rate differentials, with pf1 (pf3) denoting the portfolio with the
lowest (highest) interest rate differential. DOL denotes the average return of the three portfolios.
Announcement days are when the FOMC releases its interest rate decisions. The row labeled “diff”
indicates the difference in average returns between announcement and non-announcement days,
with the corresponding t-statistic presented in parentheses below. The sample covers January 1,
1994 to December 31, 2010. All numbers are expressed in daily returns (in bps) except for Sharpe
ratios, which are annualized taking into account the annual frequency of FOMC announcements
(8/252). Thus FOMC SR = [daily mean return FOMC/daily std returns FOMC]
√
8, and NON FOMC SR =
[daily mean return NON FOMC/daily std returns NON FOMC]
√
244.
pf1 pf2 pf3 DOL
Panel A: all days
mean -0.353 0.392 2.147 0.729
t-stat (-0.41) (0.47) (2.16) (0.94)
stdev 55.541 54.067 64.835 50.685
skew 0.342 0.026 -0.328 0.060
kurt 5.755 7.115 9.322 5.870
SR -0.101 0.115 0.526 0.228
Panel B: announcement days
mean 5.712 14.798 16.829 12.446
t-stat (1.09) (2.80) (2.73) (2.43)
stdev 61.373 61.607 71.818 59.659
skew 1.696 1.756 1.876 2.135
kurt 7.963 10.350 9.509 10.660
SR 0.263 0.679 0.663 0.590
Panel C: non-announcement days
mean -0.553 -0.085 1.661 0.341
t-stat (-0.88) (-0.14) (2.26) (0.60)
stdev 55.335 53.742 64.543 50.322
skew 0.279 -0.068 -0.434 -0.063
kurt 5.609 6.832 9.227 5.427
SR -0.089 0.000 0.435 0.151
diff 6.265 14.883 15.168 12.105
t-stat (1.17) (2.78) (2.43) (2.34)
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Table 3. Baseline Regression Results
This table reports estimated coefﬁcients from running regressions from foreign exchange excess
return portfolios on a dummy that takes the value of one on days when the FOMC makes an
announcement and zero otherwise (Panel A). In Panel B, we regress portfolio returns on a proxy of
monetary uncertainty (TIV) and its interaction with the announcement dummy. Panel C regresses
portfolio returns on our monetary policy indicator (MPI) interacted with the announcement dummy.
Data runs from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2010. Numbers in parentheses denote Newey and
West (1987) t-statistics.
pf1 pf2 pf3 DOL
Panel A: ann and non-ann returns
constant -0.558 -0.088 1.639 0.331
t-stat (-0.64) (-0.10) (1.71) (0.42)
ann dummy 6.270 14.886 15.189 12.115
t-stat (1.18) (2.78) (2.47) (2.36)
R2 0.02% 0.21% 0.15% 0.15%
Panel B: monetary policy uncertainty
constant -3.938 -1.058 -0.833 -1.943
t-stat (-1.04) (-0.22) (-0.15) (-0.45)
TIV× ann dummy 1.709 3.418 3.806 2.978
t-stat (1.36) (2.53) (2.50) (2.27)
TIV 0.861 0.228 0.590 0.560
t-stat (0.84) (0.17) (0.38) (0.46)
R2 (in %) 0.07 0.36 0.31 0.32
Panel C: monetary policy indicator
constant -0.512 0.300 1.942 0.577
t-stat (-0.59) (0.36) (2.05) (0.74)
MPI× ann dummy 4.875 5.620 5.427 5.307
t-stat (3.99) (3.60) (3.33) (3.76)
R2 (in %) 0.75 1.06 0.68 1.08
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Table 4. Regression Analysis Additional Proxies
This table reports estimated coefﬁcients from running regressions of currency portfolios on various explanatory variables as given in
equation (12) for the monetary policy uncertainty proxies (EPU, DiB FF) and global risk appetite (RV ann and VIX). “pf1” (“pf3”) is the
portfolio with the lowest (highest) interest rate differential, and DOL is the average of the three portfolios. EPU is economic policy
uncertainty, DiB FF is disagreement about the Fed Funds Rate, RV ann is realized exchange rate volatilitymeasured over a two-hourwindow
around the time of an FOMC announcement, and VIX is S&P500 implied volatility. MPI (GSS) refers to the indicator for monetary policy
shock of Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005). For brevity, we only report estimated coefﬁcient for the interaction term. Data runs from
January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2010. Newey and West (1987) t-statistics are in parentheses.
pf1 pf2
EPU× ann dummy 0.058 0.115
(1.36) (2.54)
DiB FF× ann dummy 1.812 4.297
(1.07) (2.47)
MPI (GSS)× ann dummy 4.195 3.019
(3.24) (2.14)
RV ann× ann dummy 0.651 1.450
(1.47) (2.92)
VIX× ann dummy 0.560 1.018
(1.61) (2.72)
constant -0.361 -0.643 -0.701 -7.525 -1.916 0.457 3.899 0.094 1.842 6.516
(-0.23) (-0.17) (-0.78) (-2.49) (-0.70) (0.23) (1.09) (0.11) (0.50) (1.76)
Adj. R2 (in %) 0.05 0.01 0.53 0.63 0.13 0.28 0.16 0.28 0.82 0.74
pf3 DOL
EPU× ann dummy 0.116 0.097
(2.17) (2.17)
DiB FF× ann dummy 4.194 3.434
(1.99) (2.02)
MPI (GSS)× ann dummy 3.932 3.715
(2.20) (2.65)
RV ann× ann dummy 1.838 1.313
(3.48) (2.83)
VIX× ann dummy 1.174 0.918
(2.56) (2.41)
constant 0.934 1.629 1.840 8.782 11.322 0.343 1.628 0.411 1.033 5.307
(0.47) (0.37) (1.81) (2.11) (2.89) (0.21) (0.47) (0.49) (0.33) (1.69)
Adj. R2 (in %) 0.22 0.09 0.33 0.94 0.84 0.23 0.11 0.50 0.80 0.63
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Table 5. Currency Returns Summary Statistics on announcement days by the Bank of Japan
This table reports summary statistics of currency returns on announcement (Panel B) and non-
announcement days (Panel C). Panel A reports summary statistics for all days. Portfolios are
sorted according to their interest rate differential. Pf1 (pf3) has the lowest (highest) interest rate
differential. JPY denotes the average return of the three portfolios. Announcement days are when
the Bank of Japan (BoJ) releases its interest rate decisions. The row denoted by “diff” indicates
the difference in average returns between announcement and non-announcement returns, and
the corresponding t-statistic is presented in parentheses below. The sample covers February 1,
1998 to December 31, 2010. All numbers are expressed in daily returns (in bps) except for Sharpe
ratios, which are annualized taking into account the annual frequency of BoJ announcements
(15/252). Thus BOJ SR = [daily mean return FOMC/daily std returns FOMC]
√
15, and NON BOJ SR =
[daily mean return NON BOJ/daily std returns NON BOJ]
√
237.
pf1 pf2 pf3 JPY
Panel A: all days
mean -0.188 1.247 3.188 1.415
t-stat (-0.16) (1.01) (2.25) (1.18)
stdev 75.559 80.155 92.438 78.317
skew -0.596 -0.767 -0.630 -0.731
kurt 8.322 10.673 12.340 10.941
SR -0.040 0.247 0.547 0.287
Panel B: announcement days
mean 16.936 17.024 20.524 18.161
t-stat (2.69) (2.74) (3.07) (2.98)
stdev 85.148 84.008 90.393 82.489
skew 0.748 0.067 0.433 0.377
kurt 6.780 4.601 5.637 5.548
SR 0.770 0.785 0.879 0.853
Panel C: non-announcement days
mean -0.853 0.606 2.504 0.752
t-stat (-1.00) (0.67) (2.38) (0.85)
stdev 75.226 79.965 92.504 78.152
skew -0.655 -0.806 -0.669 -0.778
kurt 8.446 10.980 12.586 11.211
SR -0.176 0.117 0.419 0.149
diff 17.789 16.419 18.019 17.409
t-stat (2.78) (2.59) (2.64) (2.80)
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Table 6. Currency Return Summary Statistics for Winsorized Data
This table reports summary statistics of currency returns on announcement and non-announcement
days for a winsorized sample where we remove outliers at the bottom and top 1%. Announcement
days arewhen the FOMC releases its interest rate decisions. pf1 is the portfoliowith the lowest interest
rate differential, while pf3 has the highest interest rate differential. DOL is a portfolio which is short
the USD and long the rest of the currencies. The sample covers January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2010.
pf1 pf2 pf3 DOL
ann non-ann ann non-ann ann non-ann ann non-ann
mean 0.463 -0.467 12.189 -0.067 11.856 1.695 8.169 0.387
t-stat (0.12) (-0.52) (2.49) (-0.08) (1.93) (1.62) (1.80) (0.47)
stdev 46.445 57.310 56.714 55.468 71.180 66.308 52.418 52.448
skew 1.755 0.429 3.469 -0.021 3.964 -0.586 4.153 0.106
kurt 11.195 7.096 26.462 7.333 31.889 13.308 33.524 7.697
N 134 4026 134 4026 134 4026 134 4026
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Table 7. Monte Carlo Analysis
This table reports summary statistics of individual currency returns (xrt) on announcement and non-announcement days as in Tables 1
and 2. t-stats are for tests of a difference in mean between announcement and non-announcement returns. “MC 95%” denotes the 95
percentile from a bootstrap distribution obtained from sampling on non-announcement days. The p-values denote the probability of
observing a mean greater than the corresponding value on announcement days by drawing from the sample of non-announcement days.
The sample covers January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2010. All numbers are expressed in daily returns (in bps). Panel A presents the results
for the individual currencies whereas Panel B presents the results for the G10 currency portfolios and theDOL portfolio.
PANEL A: INDIVIDUAL CURRENCIES
AUD CAD CHF EUR GBP JPY NOK NZD SEK
t-stat 4pm London (1.96) (0.54) (0.80) (0.57) (1.80) (0.94) (0.72) (1.44) (1.01)
215pm New York (1.13) (-0.39) (0.98) (0.56) (1.24) (0.76) (0.92) (0.36) (0.97)
4pm New York (2.72) (3.52) (0.88) (1.66) (2.94) (-0.16) (1.06) (2.50) (1.79)
ann 4pm London 16.98 3.34 6.49 4.38 11.59 6.36 7.30 15.39 8.96
215pm New York 11.29 -1.38 7.91 4.39 8.40 5.14 9.40 5.45 9.21
4pm New York 21.76 19.52 6.37 9.98 15.22 -1.59 7.88 20.27 11.90
non-ann 4pm London 1.14 0.54 0.01 0.01 0.14 -0.86 0.71 1.39 0.26
215pm New York 1.33 0.69 -0.02 0.02 0.26 -0.81 0.65 1.71 0.25
4pm New York 0.98 -0.01 0.03 -0.17 0.05 -0.58 0.70 1.23 0.16
MC 95% 4pm London 12.19 8.15 9.66 8.90 8.19 9.32 10.85 12.66 10.47
215pm New York 12.59 8.18 9.93 9.14 8.44 9.64 11.11 12.82 10.93
4pm New York 12.30 7.17 9.84 9.03 8.07 9.73 11.19 12.47 10.85
p-values 4pm London 1.0% 26.9% 13.4% 20.6% 1.0% 12.0% 14.2% 2.1% 7.9%
215pm New York 7.3% 67.4% 9.4% 21.5% 5.1% 17.2% 8.4% 29.0% 8.5%
4pm New York 0.1% 0.0% 13.9% 3.4% 0.1% 54.6% 12.6% 0.3% 3.4%
PANEL B: G10 PORTFOLIOS
pf1 pf2 pf3 DOL
t-stat 4pm London (1.02) (0.83) (1.67) (1.29)
215pm New York (0.90) (0.49) (1.04) (0.88)
4pm New York (1.17) (2.78) (2.43) (2.34)
ann 4pm London 6.621 5.349 15.192 9.097
215pm New York 6.036 3.482 10.669 6.776
4pm New York 5.712 14.798 16.829 12.481
non-ann 4pm London -0.589 0.164 1.768 0.488
215pm New York -0.522 0.266 1.858 0.575
4pm New York -0.547 -0.084 1.672 0.388
MC 95% 4pm London 7.091 7.738 10.767 7.515
215pm New York 7.291 7.941 10.889 7.704
4pm New York 7.278 7.448 10.737 7.476
4pm London 6.1% 12.9% 0.7% 2.3%
215pm New York 8.4% 24.5% 5.5% 7.7%
4pm New York 9.1% 0.0% 0.3% 0.2%
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Table 8. Currency Portfolio Return Summary Statistics Net of Transaction Costs
This table reports summary statistics for currency returns earned on FOMC announcement days net
of transaction costs. Announcement days are when the FOMC releases its interest rate decisions.
The sample covers January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2010. All numbers are expressed in daily returns
(in bps) except for Sharpe ratios, which are annualized taking into account the annual frequency of
FOMC announcements (8/252).
pf1 pf2 pf3 DOL
mean 2.782 9.977 10.506 7.755
t-stat (0.56) (1.95) (2.06) (1.64)
stdev 58.065 59.659 59.211 55.230
skew 1.531 1.796 1.804 2.111
kurt 7.215 10.388 9.135 10.485
SR 0.135 0.473 0.501 0.397
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Table 9. Currency Return Summary Statistics Macro Announcements
This table reports summary statistics of currency returns on announcement and non-announcement
days for CPI, PPI and non-farm payroll employment. Portfolios are sorted according to their interest
rate differential. Pf1 (pf3) has the lowest (highest) interest rate differential. DOL denotes the
average return of the three portfolios. Diff mean indicates the difference in average returns between
announcement and non-announcement returns, and the corresponding t-statistic is presented in
parentheses below. The sample covers January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2010. All numbers are
expressed in daily returns (in bps).
pf1 pf2 pf3 DOL
Consumer Price Index
ann 0.079 0.839 3.578 1.499
t-stat (0.02) (0.21) (0.68) (0.37)
stdev 61.457 57.384 74.322 57.486
non-ann -0.374 0.370 2.076 0.691
diff in mean 0.452 0.469 1.502 0.808
t-stat (0.10) (0.11) (0.28) (0.20)
Purchasing Power Index
ann 1.624 3.758 5.872 3.751
t-stat (0.40) (1.05) (1.41) (1.09)
stdev 58.541 51.229 59.605 49.347
non-ann -0.452 0.222 1.959 0.576
diff in mean 2.076 3.536 3.913 3.175
t-stat (0.50) (0.96) (0.91) (0.90)
Non-Farm Payroll Employment
ann -7.244 3.372 6.728 0.952
t-stat (-1.64) (0.79) (1.47) (0.24)
stdev 62.569 60.506 64.805 57.006
non-ann -0.012 0.245 1.921 0.718
diff in mean -7.232 3.127 4.807 0.234
t-stat (-1.60) (0.72) (1.02) (0.06)
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A Value-at-Risk Constraints
In this appendix, we show that our main theoretical results remain unchanged if ﬁnanciers are sub-
ject to a value-at-risk constraint as opposed to the limited commitment constraint of Gabaix and
Maggiori (2015), thus illustrating that our model’s key insights are not sensitive to the speciﬁc nature
of the constraint assumed in Section 2. To make the analysis tractable, we assume that ﬁnanciers are
only uncertain aboutmonetary policy in the U.S. and face no fundamental uncertainty. In particular,
we assume that f1 = f0 = f and d1 = d0 = d.
Consider the model presented in Section 2 and suppose that instead of the limited commitment
constraint in (2), each ﬁnancier is subject to a value-at-risk constraint in the spirit of Adrian and Shin
(2014), according to which the likelihood that her wealth at t = 1 falls below some negative threshold
 cannot exceed some α < 1.20 As a result, the representative ﬁnancier faces the following problem:
max
Q
E[V ]
s.t. P(V ≤ ) ≤ α,
(13)
where V = (R∗e1/e0 −R)Q. Given that the value-at-risk constraint has to bind at the optimal solu-
tion, the representative ﬁnancier’s positionQ satisﬁes
P
(
R∗Q(f −RQ)
f +Q
−RQ ≤ 
)
= α,
where we are using the fact that exchange rates satisfy the market clearing conditions (3) and (4). As
a result,
P
(
R ≥ R
∗f − (Q+ f)/Q
f +Q(R∗ + 1)
)
= α,
which implies that, when  → 0,
Q =
f
R∗ + 1
(
R∗
E[R] + σRF−1(1− α) − 1
)
, (14)
whereF denotes the cumulative distribution function of the interest rateRwhen re-centered around
zero and normalized by its standard deviation. Combining the above with the market clearing con-
ditions (3) and (4) implies that equilibrium exchange rates are given by
e0 =
R∗d−1f
R∗ + 1
(
1
E[R] + σRF−1(1− α) + 1
)
(15)
e1 = d
−1f − Rd
−1f
R∗ + 1
(
R∗
E[R] + σRF−1(1− α) − 1
)
. (16)
20We impose the technical assumption that  = 0 to ensure equilibrium uniqueness. Given that  can be chosen to be
arbitrarily small, this assumption has no bearing on our results. In fact, we present our analytical results for the case that
 → 0.
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Equations (14)–(16) provide a complete characterization of equilibrium in the economy with value-
at-risk constraints. Furthermore, they imply that foreign currency’s excess return is equal to
φ = (1 + 1/R)
(
R∗ + 1
1 + (E[R] + σRF−1(1− α))−1
)
−R∗. (17)
The above expression immediately implies that an increase in monetary policy uncertainty in-
creases excess returns (∂φ/∂σR > 0), consistent with our result in Proposition 1. Furthermore, an
ex post adoption of an expansionary policy in the U.S. — which corresponds to a decrease in R
— increases the difference between foreign currency’s excess returns on announcement and non-
announcement days (∂2φ/∂R∂σR < 0), an observation that is in line with Proposition 3. Finally,
it is easy to verify that, in line with Proposition 2, a higher interest rate in the foreign country not
only increases expected excess returns (∂E[φ]/∂R∗ > 0), but also increases the mean returns that are
earned in compensation for higher monetary policy uncertainty (∂2E[φ]/∂R∗∂σR > 0).
In summary, the above discussion illustrates that our baseline model’s insights presented in Sec-
tion 2 are not sensitive to the speciﬁc nature of the limited commitment constraint and hold for any
constraint that induces a downward-sloping demand for risk taking by ﬁnanciers.
B Proofs and Derivations
Proof of Lemma 1 Recall from (10) that Γ is determined as the solution to the equation
d2Γ(Γ + c)2 − γσ2f (Γ + c)2 − γb2σ2R = 0. (18)
Therefore, by the implicit function theorem,
∂Γ
∂σ2R
=
γb2
Γ + c
(
3d2Γ + d2c− 2γσ2f
)−1
.
Replacing for γσ2f = d
2Γ− γb2σ2R(Γ + c)−2 from (18) in the above expression implies that
∂Γ
∂σ2R
=
γb2
Γ + c
(
d2Γ + d2c+
2γb2σ2R
(Γ + c)2
)−1
.
The right-hand side of the above equation is strictly positive, thus implying thatΓ is strictly increasing
in σR.
Proof of Lemma 2 Since R∗ > E[R], the characterization in (7) implies that an increase in Γ re-
duces e0. On the other hand, equation (8) implies that increasing Γ increases e1. As a result, φ =
(R∗e1)/(Re0) is strictly increasing in Γ.
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Proof of Proposition 2 We start by proving that dE[φ]/dR∗ > 0. Note that
dE[φ]
dR∗
=
∂E[φ]
∂Γ
∂Γ
∂R∗
+
∂E[φ]
∂R∗
.
Lemma 2 guarantees that ∂E[φ]/∂Γ is positive. Therefore, the proof is complete once we show that
∂Γ/∂R∗ and ∂E[φ]/∂R∗ are also positive.
We ﬁrst show that ∂Γ/∂R∗ ≥ 0. Recall from the proof of Lemma 1 that Γ satisﬁes equation (18).
Therefore, by the implicit function theorem,
∂Γ
∂R∗
= −2dΓ(Γ + c)E[R]− 2d
−1γσ2f (Γ + c)E[R]− 2d−1γbf0σ2R
d2(Γ + c)2 + 2d2Γ(Γ + c)− 2γσ2f (Γ + c)
.
Multiplying the numerator and denominator by Γ + c and replacing for d2Γ(Γ + c)2 − γσ2f (Γ + c)2 in
the denominator from (18) leads to
∂Γ
∂R∗
=
2γbf0σ
2
R(Γ + c)− 2E[R]
(
d2Γ(Γ + c)2 − γσ2f (Γ + c)2
)
d3(Γ + c)3 + 2γdb2σ2R
.
On the other hand, equation (18) implies that d2Γ(Γ + c)2 − γσ2f (Γ + c)2 = γb2σ2R. Therefore,
∂Γ
∂R∗
= 2γbσ2R
(
f0(Γ + c)− bE[R]
d3(Γ + c)3 + 2γdb2σ2R
)
= 2γbf0σ
2
R
(
Γd+ E[R] + E2[R]
d4(Γ + c)3 + 2γd2b2σ2R
)
, (19)
wherewe are using the fact that b = d−1f0(R∗−E[R]) and c = d−1(1+R∗)E[R]. It is now immediate that
the right-hand side of the above equation is always non-negative, thus guaranteeing that ∂Γ/∂R∗ ≥ 0.
Next, we show that ∂E[φ]/∂R∗ ≥ 0. To this end, note that the characterization in (7) and (8) implies
that the equilibrium excess returns of the foreign currency is equal to
φ =
R∗(Γf1d+ f1(R∗ + 1)E[R] +Rf0E[R]−RR∗f0)
Rf0(Γd+R∗(E[R] + 1))
.
As a result,
E[φ] =
R∗(E[R−1]Γd+ (R∗ + 1)E[R]E[R−1] + E[R]−R∗)
Γd+R∗(E[R] + 1)
. (20)
Differentiating the above expression with respect toR∗ and some algebraic manipulations lead to
∂E[φ]
∂R∗
= R∗
(
E[R]E[R−1]− 1) 2Γd+R∗(E[R] + 1)
(Γd+R∗(E[R] + 1))2
+ Γd
ΓdE[R−1] + E[R] + E[R]E[R−1]
(Γd+R∗(E[R] + 1))2
.
By Jensen’s inequality, E[R]E[R−1] ≥ 1. Therefore, the right-hand side of the above expression is
non-negative, thus completing the proof of the ﬁrst statement.
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We prove the second statement of the proposition assuming that R∗ ≈ E[R]. Note that equation
(20) can be rewritten as
E[φ] = R∗E[R−1]−R∗ (1 + E[R−1])( R∗ − E[R]
Γd+R∗(E[R] + 1)
)
.
Differentiating the above expression with respect to σR implies that
∂E[φ]
∂σR
=
R∗d(R∗ − E[R])
(Γd+R∗(E[R] + 1))2
(
1 + E[R−1]
) ∂Γ
∂σR
.
As a result, the derivate of the above expression with respect to R∗ evaluated in the neighborhood of
E[R] is given by
∂2E[φ]
∂R∗∂σR
∣∣∣∣
R∗=E[R]
=
R∗d
(
1 + E[R−1]
)
(Γd+R∗(E[R] + 1))2
∂Γ
∂σR
.
On the other hand, recall from (19) that ∂Γ/∂R∗ > 0, thus guaranteeing that the right-hand side of
the above expression is positive.
Proof of Proposition 3 Equations (7) and (8) imply that the foreign currency’s excess return is given
by
φ =
R∗f1
Rf0
−R∗
(
f1 +Rf0
Rf0
)(
R∗ − E[R]
Γd+R∗(E[R] + 1)
)
.
As a result,
∂φ
∂σR
=
R∗d(R∗ − E[R])
(Γd+R∗(E[R] + 1))2
(
1 +
f1
Rf0
)
∂Γ
∂σR
.
By Lemma 1, the term ∂Γ/∂σR is positive. Therefore, it is immediate that the right-hand side of the
above equation is decreasing in R, thus guaranteeing that ∂2φ/∂R∂σR < 0.
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